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RECENT DECISIONS
Two of the Clayton Act so that civil relief was permitted then "selling
at unreasonably low prices" should be placed in the same category as
it is also an unfair trade practice.
Until this decision the majority of lower courts sustained the con-
tention that Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act was an anti-
trust law and allowed civil relief. 5 Most of these courts failed to dis-
tinguish between the effects of the various provisions of the Robinson-
Patman Act and held that the Robinson-Patman Act was an anti-trust
law in its entirety. They considered "selling at unreasonably low prices
for the purpose of destroying competition" just as great an evil as price
discrimination, and provided the same remedy to an individual injured
by a violation of anything mentioned in the Robinson-Patman Act.
This line of reasoning is best expressed in the Balian Ice Cream case6
where the court stated that the three main statutes dealing with mono-
polies and combinations are the Sherman Anti-trust Act, Clayton Act,
and the Robinson-Patman Act, and they are all closely related. Each
Act was enacted to curb conduct that the previous acts failed to pro-
hibit. All three of the Acts aim to suppress combinations to restrain
competition and attempts to monopolize, and maintain the freedom of
commerce between the states. The treble damage provision was not
only to compensate an individual for loss as a result of one of the pro-
hibited acts, but it also induces potential violators not to act contra to
the anti-trust laws, as the financial consequences are great.
The Supreme Court notes that the Justice Department has never
prosecuted an individual for a violation of Section Three. If private
civil remedies are not available to individuals, the policy of the Justice
Department will undoubtedly change, and violators of Section Three
will now be faced with criminal prosecution.
PAUL V. LuCKE
Constitutional Law - Interpretation of the Smith Act - Four-
teen defendants were charged with conspiring: 1) to advocate and
teach the duty and necessity of overthrowing the government of the
5The following held that private remedies were available for a violation of
Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act: Dean Oil Co. v. American Oil
Co., 147 F. Supp. 414 (1956) ; Atlanta Brick Co. v. 0' Neal, 44 F. Supp. 39(1942); Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F. Supp. 408 (1950); Hershel California
Fruit Products Co. Inc. v. Hunt Foods Inc., 119 F. Supp. 603 (1954) ; Balian
Ice Cream Co. Inc. v .Arden Farms Co., 94 F. Supp. 796 (1950) ; Meyers v.
Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670 (1951) ; Kentucky-Tennessee Light and Power
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 37 F. Supp. 728 (1941); A. J. Goodman and Son
Inc. v. United Lacquer Mfg. Corp., 81 F Stpp. 890 (1949); Vance v. Safeway
Stores Inc.. 239 F. 2d 144 (1957).
The following cases held that Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act
was not an anti-trust law and prevented private relief: National Used Car
Market Report Inc. v. National Auto Dealers Association, 108 F. Supp. 692,(1951) aff'd 200 F. 2d 359 (1952); Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 238
F. 2d 86( ).6 Balian Ice Cream Co. Inc- v. Arden Farms Co., 94 F. Supp. 796 (1950).
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United States by force and violence, and 2) to organize, as the Com-
munist Party of the United States, a society of persons who so advo-
cate and teach, all with the intent of causing said overthrow as speedily
as possible. Convictions were sought under 18 U.S.C. §2385, the sec-
tion of the present code corresponding to the Smith Act of 1940
(which shall hereafter be referred to as the Smith Act.) The de-
fendants were convicted in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California and this conviction was upheld by the
Court of Appeals in Yates v. United States, 225 F. 2d 146 (9th Cir.
1955). The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Petitioners contended
that the lower courts misinterpreted the word "organize"; that the in-
structions given by the trial court were erroneous; that the evidence
was insufficient to sustain the convictions; and that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel applies to bar petitioner Schneiderman's conviction.
Held: Reversed. The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Harlan,
accepted the first three contentions of the petitioners, acquitted five
petitioners and remanded the cases of the other nine. Justice Douglas
and Black concurred in the acquittals but held that the other nine
petitioners should have been acquitted as well. Justice Burton con-
curred in the decision but does not agree with the majority's interpre-
tation of "organize." Justice Clark dissents, holding that the majority
has misconstrued the meaning of the Smith Act. Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957).
Attention naturally centers on the holding in favor of the pe-
titioners 1) that the term "organize" as used in the Smith Act was
erroneously construel by the lower courts; and 2) that the trial court's
instructions to the jury erroneously excluded from the case the issue
of "incitement to action". The recent dismissal by the government of
the action against all the petitioners indicates the need for a close
scrutiny of the philosophy of the court.
To understand the case it is necessary to look at the statutory pro-
visions under which the petitioners were convicted. The Smith Act of
19401 was revised in 1948 and became 18 U.S.C. §2385. This action
was again revised in 1956 when a conspiracy clause was added to the
section. There was no conspiracy clause in §2385 between 1948
and 1956 and in those years the general conspiracy section2 applied.
The 1954 revision changed the wording, but not the meaning, of the
Act. The petitioners herein were charged under the first and third
clauses of §2385 which are set out in the margin. 3
1 18 U.S.C. §§10, 11, & 13 (1946).
2 18 U.S.C. §371 (1956) provides: "If two or more persons conspire ... to com-
mit any offense against the United States . . .in any manner or for any pur-
pose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than 10,000 dollars or imprinsoned
not more than 5 years, or both."
3 18 U.S.C. §2385 (1956) provides: "Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates,
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In construing the section indicated, the Court found it necessary
to define the term "organize." The Court accepted the contention of
the petitioners that "organize" must be defined narrowly to mean only
the "acts entering into the creation of a new organization, and not to
acts thereafter performed in carrying on its activities even though such
acts may loosely be termed 'organizational'." 4  This interpretation
meant that the statute of limitations had run before this action was
begun. The respondent had contended that it meant a continuing pro-
cess which goes on throughout the life of an organization. The re-
spondent pointed out that to construe the word as the Court does here
would have given no meaning whatsoever to the original Smith Act
provision of 1940 since the Communist Party was founded in 1919
in the United States. Justice Barton in a concurring opinion and Jus-
tice Clark in his dissent accept this contention of the respondent. The
majority side-stepped this contention by stating that the act was de-
signed to deal with anarchists and syndicalists as well as Communists.
The majority supports its narrow interpretation with the words of
Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Wiltberger,5 who said that:
".. . the rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps
not much less old than construction itself." To the detriment of their
argument, however, the majority also quotes from the same decision
the statement: "The maxim is not to be applied as to narrow the words
of the statute to the exclusion of cases which those words, in their or-
dinary acceptation, or in that sense in which the legislature has ob-
viously used them, would comprehend." 6 In other words, the statute
should not be construed so strictly as to defeat the intent of the legis-
lators. The Court admits that a concern over Communism was one of
the chief forces leading to the passage of the Smith Act. And yet the
majority claims that Congress inserted one of the major portions of
the act without intending that it should apply to that Party. Justice
Clark complains that: "This construction frustrates the purpose of the
abets, advises, or teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of over-
throwing or destroying the government of the United States or the govern-
ment of any State, Territory, District or Possession thereof, or the government
of any political subdivision therein, by force or violence, or the assassination
of any officer of any such government; or
"Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize, any society, group,
or assembly of persons who teach, advocate or encourage the overthrow or
destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a
member of or affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons,
knowing the purpose thereof
"Shall be fined not more than 20,000 dollars or imprisoned not more than
20 years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States
or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his
conviction."
4354 U.S. at 310.
5 United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, quoted in 354 U.S. at 304-305.
6 Ibid.
19581
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW[o.
Congress for the Act was passed in 1940 primarily to curb the growing
strength and activity of the Party."7 He does not feel that the ex-
planation that the act was to apply to anarchists and syndicalists as
well as Communists is persuasive. When the threat of the latter is
compared with that of the former this feeling seems quite logical.
The Court, although indicating that it must use the ordinary and
plain meaning of the word "organize," nevertheless discounts some dic-
tionary help. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed.
unabridged) defines "organize" as:
1. To furnish with organs; to give an organic structure to.
2. To arrange or constitute in interdependent parts, each
having a special function, act, office or relation with re-
spect to the whole; to systematize; to get into working
order; as, to organize an army; to organize recruits.
FUNK AND WAGNALL'S NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY (1947) defines
"organize" as:
1. To bring into systematic connection and cooperation as
parts of a whole, or to bring the various parts of into
effective correlation and cooperation; as, to organize the
peasants into an army.
The example of organizing an army seems particularly apt in respect
to the Communist Party as Judge Fee in the Court of Appeals de-
cision commented. An army is not "organized" when the order to do
so is issued. Nor is it "organized" when the headquarters staff is se-
lected or even when the cadres are assigned. It is not "organized" until
the component units are brought to prescribed strength and fitness.s
Like an army, the Communist Party is also being built to strength and,
fortunately for the United States, it has not advanced far in its
"organization."
The trial judge in this case defined "organize" to include the
recruiting of new members and forming of new units and the regroup-
ing or expansion of existing clubs.9 This definition, as the respondent
contended, seems to fall squarely within the dictionary definitions given
above, which definitions appear to give the ordinary, plain meaning of
the word "organize."
The other part of the decision which requires close scrutiny is the
Court's reaction to the instruction given by the trial court. The majority
here holds that the instructions given by the trial court were defective.
The pertinent parts of the instruction are the following:
"The holding of a belief or opinion does not constitute ad-
vocacy or teaching. Hence the Smith Act does not prohibit per-
sons who may believe that the violent overthrow and destruction
7354 U.S. at 348. See also Note 3 supra, 354 U.S. at p. 348.
8 Yates v. United States, 225 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1955) at 1. 156.
1 United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 906, at 935 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
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of the Government of the United States is probable or inevitable
from expressing that belief. Whether such belief be reasonable
or unreasonable is immaterial. Prediction or prophecy is not
advocacy.
"Any advocacy or teaching which does not include the urging
of force and violence as the means of overthrowing and destroy-
ing the Government of the United States is not within the issue
of the indictment here and can constitute no basis for any finding
against the defendants.
"The kind of advocacy and teaching which is charged and
upon which your verdict must be reached is not merely a de-
sirability but a necessity that Government of the United States
be overthrown and destroyed by force and violence and not
merely a propriety but a duty to overthrow and destroy the
Government of the United States by force and violence." 10
The trial court continued by warning the jury that the defendants
could not be convicted for advocating ideas, divorced from action, and
by telling the jury that the defendants had a constitutional right to hold,
express and advocate opinions, ". . . even though their opinions are
rejected by the overwhelming majority of the American people."' ,
The judge emphasized the defendants' right to criticize our govern-
ment and its policies. Certainly these instructions should be sufficient
under the Dennis Case where the instructions, as given by Judge
Medina in the trial court, were approved by the Supreme Court. The
pertinent portion of those instructions is:
". .. it is not the abstract doctrine of overthrowing or
destroying organized government by the unlawful means which
is denounced by this law, but the teaching and advocacy of action
for the accomplishment of the purpose, by language reasonably
and ordinarily calculated to incite persons to such action." [em-
phasis added] 12
The word "incite" seems to be the crux of this matter. The Court
in this case holds that the absence of this word makes the trial court's
instructions defective. The trial judge refused to use the word "incite"
because he felt that, in its ordinary usage, the word had a connotation
of immediacy which had no place here. Defense counsel shared this
interpretation. The trial court, not wishing to give the jury the mis-
taken impression that they must find advocacy to immediate action in
order to convict, couched the instruction in the terms given above.':
Unfortunately, as Justice Clark points out, 4 the judge now finds that,
from a practical viewpoint, it is better to use the exact words approved
by the Court, and not those which he believes meet the requirements
of the Dennis Case as they apply to this particular case. The Court
10354 U.S. at 313.
11Id. at 314.
12Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, at 511 (1951).
13 Brief for Respondent, p. 83, Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
14 354 U.S. at 350.
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here appears to be doing just what Chief Justice Vinson warned against
in the Dennis Case when he said: "To those who would paralyze our
Government in a semantic straitjacket we must reply that all concepts
are relative."' 15 Justice Clark states that: "While there may be some
distinctions between the charges, as I view them they are without
material difference."']6
If the instructions quoted above were not enough, at another point
in the instructions the trial judge, in distinguishing unpunishable ad-
vocacy of an abstract doctrine from punishable advocacy, instructed
the jury that to establish the offense of conspiracy against any of the
defendants:
"The evidence must show beyond a reasonable doubt:
"Third, that the accused, while a member of the conspiracy
had the specific intent to cause or bring about the overthrow
and destruction of the Government of the United States by force
and violence as speedily as circumstances would permit.'
17
This instruction, except that it does not use the vital word "incite," is
very close to the Dennis Case instructions.
The Supreme Court holds that the Smith Act does not prohibit
"advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract principle,"
divorced from any effort to instigate action to that end, even if such
advocacy or teaching is engaged in with evil intent.18 It would seem
from the above that the trial court adequately made the point that there
must be more than mere advocacy of abstract doctrine to convict. The
Court admits that the distinction between the advocacy or teaching of
doctrines, with evil intent, and that which is directed to stirring people
to action "are often subtle and difficult to grasp."' 9 Justice Clark finds
them too "subtle and difficult to grasp.
20
The Court here appears to have imposed a very effective "semantic
straitjacket" upon the words of the Smith Act both in requiring the
use of the exact words of the Dennis instructions and in its con-
struction of "organize."
After overturning the convictions on the first two contentions, the
Court then acquitted five of the defendants on the facts. As to this
action Justice Clark states:
"In any event, this Court should not acquit anyone here. In
its long history I find no case in which an acquittal has been or-
dered by this Court solely on the facts. It is somewhat late to
start in now usurping the function of the jury, especially where
15,341 U.S. at 508. See also 225 F.2d at 151.
16 354 U.S. at 350.
17 United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. at 933.
1-s354 U.S. at 318.
1I Id. at 326.
201 d. at 350.
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new trials are to be held covering the same charges .... To say
the least, the Government should have an opportunity to pre-
sent its evidence under these changed conditions." (i.e., in light
of this decision)." 21
While this writer agrees with Justice Clark, this question becomes
rather academic in light of recent developments. The Government,
apparently recognizing that this decision weakened its case against the
petitioners to such an extent that convictions would be impossible to
secure, moved for dismissal in the District Court, which motion was
granted.
The reader should also note that two Justices, Black and Douglas,
only concur in the acquittals of the five petitioners and, dissenting from
the majority, hold that the other nine should also have been acquitted.
Justice Douglas, in his opinion, quotes with approval a statement by
Jefferson that ".... it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil
government, to interfere when principles break out into overt acts
against peace and good order. ' 22 One can only wonder if the entire
Court is tending towards this approach. Certainly the "subtle and
difficult to grasp" distinctions found by the majority do not lend them-
selves to a clear and distinct answer to such a query.
Application of the Yates Case in lower court decisions to the detri-
ment of the Government has already been found in United States v.
Silverman.2 3 In that case a prospective Party member was not urged
to immediate bloodshed but merely asked to join a group which would
use such means if necessary. The Court of Appeals held that a state-
ment that force will be necessary, accompanied by good proof of the
specific evil intent of the speaker, is not an example of incitement.
Statements that the Party will take action "at the proper time to over-
throw the present system" and that the Party "will fight for Socialism"
were considered too remote from concrete action to regarded as a
violation of the Smith Act. The Court bases this decision on the Yates
Case. This almost appears to be approaching the Douglas view.
RICHARD T. BECKER
Federal Income Taxation - Tax Accounting - When an Accrual
Basis Taxpayer Should Report Prepaid Income Items - The tax-
payer corporation, owner of certain hotel property, entered into a 10
year lease contract in 1949, for the period 1950-1959. The contract
called for an annual rental of $30,000, with an advance payment to the
taxpayer of $30,000, the latter to apply on the rental for the last year
of the lease.' The taxpayer, in accordance with its accrual method
21 Id. at 346-347.
22 Id. at 340.
23 U.S. v. Silverman, 26 U.S.L. Week, 2155 (2d Cit. 1957).
'The taxpayer had also argued that since the lessee had preferred paying the
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